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Abstract: Media contain various cues to opinions of others and therefore serve as an important source
of information about the climate of opinion. We distinguish explicit cues directly describing opinion
distributions in society, from implicit cues lacking such a direct reference. In an experiment, we examined
the relative impact of survey data (explicit cue) and arguments (implicit cue) on climate of opinion
judgments. While survey results strongly affected assessments, argumentation had an effect only when
no survey information was available. However, arguments produced an indirect effect, as they strongly
affected personal opinions, which in turn influenced climate of opinion judgments (projection).
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Thinking of Others.  
Effects of Implicit and Explicit Media Cues on Climate of Opinion Perceptions. 
What do Americans think of Barack Obama? Do they oppose or favor the government’s 
foreign policy? When asked to assess the way others think about certain people or issues, indi-
viduals can use various sources of information. They can, on the one hand, draw on external in-
formation by monitoring their personal social environment or mass media coverage. Opinions or 
behaviors observed this way, can serve as indicators of public opinion.
1
 For instance, if friends, 
family, or acquaintances support America’s foreign policy, an observer could generalize this atti-
tude to people outside his direct environment.
2
 The mass media, as a second external source pre-
sent a wide range of indicators of prevalent opinions in society as well.
3
 Media can convey ex-
plicit information on existing opinion distributions, e.g. opinion surveys, or rather implicit infor-
mation, like arguments, individual opinions, or in form of general news slant. Following Noelle-
Neumann, the mass media are important for public opinion judgments
4
 especially when other 
information sources like first-hand experiences or interpersonal communication are not available. 
Besides external, people are also guided by their own attitudes, which they can project on-
to their social environment. Well known perceptual phenomena such as the looking-glass- or the 




Up to now, studies examining the effects of media cues on the perception of public opin-
ion are found in the fields of exemplification research
6
, research on the persuasive press infer-
ence
7




, and selective exposure
10
. While exemplification 
studies focus predominantly on the effects of single case descriptions compared to those of base-
rate information
11
 persuasive press inference- and hostile media studies examine the influence of 
(perceived) media slant.
12
 We extent this view by comparing the effects of arguments within a 
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newspaper report as implicit cues to public opinion with poll information as an explicit cue. Fol-
lowing Noelle-Neumann’s spiral of silence theory, we also distinguish between effects on current 
and future climate of opinion perceptions
13
 in order to examine possible differences regarding the 
relative importance of implicit and explicit media cues.  
 
1. Theoretical Considerations 
Implicit and Explicit Cues to the Climate of Opinion 
Media coverage provides recipients with a broad range of potential information about the 
climate of opinion. Besides opinion polls—as probably the most prominent example
14
—there are 
also more subtle cues to public opinion, e.g. the depiction of individual behaviors and opinions 
(exemplars)
15
 or the general slant of news.
16
  
Researchers have been aware of this particular function of mass media for quite a while
17
 
and have examined media content relevant to climate of opinion judgments.
18
 According to the 
directness media content refers to public opinion we can distinguish explicit from implicit cues. 
Explicit cues refer to content that directly describes prevailing opinion distributions or 
proportions in society. Journalists present these direct descriptions e.g. in form of poll data and 
depict them in charts, tables, or report them in written form (e.g. “62 Percent of U.S. citizens ap-
preciate the government’s foreign policy”).
19
 Representations of poll data in the media have in-
creased significantly in the last few decades and have become a salient feature of coverage, espe-
cially prior to elections.
20
  
Implicit cues on the other hand do not provide a direct reference to the climate of opinion. 
Thus, recipients themselves must establish this cognitive link. For instance, if individuals or 
groups of people declare their support for, or opposition to a certain position (e.g. “We oppose 
U.S. interventions in the Middle East”), or show respective behaviors (e.g. by attending demon-
THINKING OF OTHERS  3 
strations), recipients could generalize this observation.
21 
Furthermore, general news slant
22
 as 




can convey impressions 
of opinion distributions in society. 
 
Cognitive Processing of Implicit and Explicit Cues to the Climate of Opinion 
The differentiation between implicit and explicit cues derives from theoretical considera-
tions regarding the way they are cognitively processed. When recipients receive explicit infor-
mation on the climate of opinion (e.g. “73 percent of the U.S. population welcomes the abandon-
ment of nuclear energy”) they possibly remember and retrieve it when they assess public opin-
ion.
25
 In this case, judgments should result from learning processes. In contrast, assessments 
based on implicit indicators derive from cognitive heuristics that allow judgment-formation even 
if direct information about the climate of opinion is not available. 
Cognitive processing of explicit cues. When people form judgments, they often draw on 
information that is available and easily accessible in their memory. The accessibility of infor-
mation increases the more recently or frequently it has been perceived.
26
 Moreover, memory con-
tent matching the object of evaluation, or being relevant to the judgment in question, becomes 
more important (applicability). This also applies to statistical information: the more a person be-
lieves that statistical information suits a following judgment, the more the evaluation will depend 
on this information.
27
 In addition, studies analyzing the effects of survey results showed, that for 
the most part people are able to adequately recall prevailing majority ratios,
28
 and that this infor-
mation exerts a strong influence on public opinion assessment.
29
 
Therefore we assume that judgments regarding the climate of opinion are based on poll in-
formation that is (1.) readily available and (2.) matching the judgment in question. 
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H1: Surveys, as explicit media cues, influence recipients’ judgments of the climate of opin-
ion in the direction of the survey results. 
 
Cognitive processing of implicit cues. Since the climate of opinion cannot be inferred di-
rectly from implicit media cues, people must engage in alternative cognitive processes. The “per-
suasive press inference” (PPI) described by Gunther explains how individuals assess public opin-
ion on the basis of media coverage.
30
 Gunther—in line with third-person effect research
31
 and the 
more general “influence of presumed media influence” approach
32
—assumes that recipients be-
lieve in strong media effects on other people. Consequently, they also think that media content 
exerts a persuasive effect, induced by the slant of coverage. Furthermore, the PPI assumes that 
recipients believe that the media reach a broad audience and provide them with more or less simi-
lar content. Based on these assumptions, recipients generalize the presumed effect of tendentious 
media coverage and infer corresponding opinion distributions from it.
33
 However, there is also an 
alternative explanation for the relationship between news slant and public opinion perception that 
Gunther mentions in his pioneer study and which he calls “reflection”. The idea is that instead of 
expecting media to shape public opinion recipients might simply see it as it’s mirror. Neverthe-
less, the PPI and the reflection-hypothesis predict a positive effect of article slant on public opin-
ion perception although the cognitive processes they rely on differ.
34
 This leads us to H2: 
H2: If arguments in a media report support (oppose) a certain opinion, the perceived public 
agreement to this opinion increases (decreases). 
 
Persuasive Effects of Implicit and Explicit Media Cues 
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Media cues to public opinion can not only exert an influence on climate of opinion per-
ceptions but also on personal opinions and even behavior. Two fields of research have contribut-
ed to the understanding of the persuasive effects of publicized polls:  
The first field emerged as an early reaction to the publication of election polls and it fo-
cusses on the consequences for voting behavior, with rather mixed results.
35
 Sometimes band-
wagon effects are observed, meaning that voters tend to take the side of the supposed winner.
36
 In 
other cases people tend support the candidate lagging behind (underdog effect).
37
 Studies trying 
to specify the conditions under which the two effects occur found that underdog effects are more 
likely when the candidate lagging behind in the polls is displayed as disadvantaged and under-
privileged. Voters then tend to support this candidate because they feel sympathy or pity.
38
 How-
ever, a recent meta-analysis shows that bandwagon effects occur slightly more often than under-
dog effects
39
 especially if additional information on candidates is scarce, e.g. in the case of issue-
centered elections or referenda.
40
 How can this tendency be explained theoretically? Mutz as-
sumes that the reception of survey data leads to an activation of existing cognitions and recipients 
start reflecting why other people may hold certain (majority) opinions. Memory content activated 
this way can in turn influence one’s personal opinion (self-persuasion). The probability that cog-
nitions are in accordance with the presented majority opinion (bandwagon), increases if a person 
does not hold a strong opinion or lacks information about the situation. In this case, he or she 
tends to fall in line with the majority view.
41
 
The second approach explaining persuasive poll effects originates in social psychology 
and is known as social proof.
42
 Social proof means that in certain situations people tend to align 
their attitudes and behavior to the majority because they want to make correct decisions. Very 
similar to the studies of poll effects, social proof is found to be most prevalent in low information 
settings, when the situation is uncertain, unfamiliar
43
 or when individuals perceive similarities 
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between themselves and others.
44
 On the other hand, tendencies to conform to the majority are 
less pronounced when judgments or decisions are important and difficult at the same time.
45
 We 
therefore assume that in new and unknown situations people tend to be persuaded by majority 
opinions depicted by polls. 
H3a: If survey information on an unknown issue is presented recipients tend to follow the ma-
jority opinion. 
 
Besides social cues like polls, other message characteristics are also known to influence 
personal opinions and attitudes. Especially rational persuasive appeals can change the way people 
think about certain issues. Based on the elaboration-likelihood model
46
 two independent meta-
analyses by Allen (1991) and O’Keefe (1999) have shown that (one and two-sided) messages 
have substantial persuasive effects on recipients opinions.
47
 Also, a greater number of arguments 
pointing in a certain direction increases the likelihood that a person will change his or her opinion 
accordingly.
48
 In line with this research we reach the following assumption regarding the persua-
sive effect of arguments:  
H3b: If arguments on an unknown issue are presented the recipient’s opinion will follow the 
slant of the arguments. 
 
Personal Opinion and Climate of Opinion Assessment 
Besides implicit and explicit information as external cues, people are also guided by their 
own opinions when assessing public opinion. In many cases, one can observe a strong relation-
ship between attitudes and the perceived majority opinion, an effect known as social projection.
49
 
Projection can be a result of social selection processes, since people tend to select their social 
surroundings according to their own attitudes. In this way, social experiences characterized by 
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agreement with other people are more frequent, and therefore cognitively more available, if 
judgments on the climate of opinion are formed. A second explanation refers to a strong focus on 
one’s own opinion during judgment formation, which is more likely to occur if a person holds an 
extreme opinion. Due to high personal involvement, the individual concentrates so heavily on his 
own attitude that other opinions are underestimated or ignored. A further, motivational explana-
tion considers the cause of the correlation to lie in the positive effects resulting from a consensus 
between the individual and his social environment (e.g. social approval, self-enhancement). To 
date, there is still little clarity regarding the causes of projection effects.
50
 Nevertheless, the pre-
vious remarks suggest that personal opinions have a substantial influence on the perceived cli-
mate of opinions, which leads us to the following hypothesis: 
H4: The more positive one’s personal opinion on an issue, the more positively he or she will 
assess the climate of opinion with respect to the issue. 
 
Perceptions of the Current and Future Climate of Opinion 
A frequently encountered distinction in public opinion research is that between current 
and future climate of opinion perceptions. The differentiation was first introduced by Noelle-
Neumann in the spiral of silence theory
51
 and was subsequently adopted by other researchers.
52
 
Whereas the current climate of opinion refers to impressions of present opinion distributions, 
respectively perceptions of actual majorities or minorities in society, the future climate of opinion 
describes expectations how public opinion will develop over time.
53
 Noelle-Neumann assumes 
that differences between the two judgments indicate a process of change in public opinion and 
that it is the future expectation which determines individual behavior strongest.
54
 
Therefore, most studies focus on the effects of current and future public opinion percep-
tions on attitudes or behavior
55
 but do not analyze differences in the formation of the two judg-
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ments.
56
 An exception is a qualitative study by Shamir and Shamir examining whether peoples’ 
assessments of the current and future state of opinion are based on the same information.
57
 The 
authors conclude that “people must use very different information arrays in estimating current 
opinion distributions and future opinion trends. In forming estimates of the current distribution of 
opinion, people will indeed rely mainly on social cues. However, their expectations of the future 
distribution of opinions will reflect a much wider informational array, consistent with a more ra-
tional prospective outlook. When perceptions and expectations diverge, it is because they are af-
fected differently by these two distinct information arrays. Such divergence allows us to assess 
these two sources of public opinion and their role in public opinion dynamics.”
58
 
By analyzing think aloud protocols Shamir and Shamir reveal some important aspects: Es-
timates of the future climate of opinion were rather based on what they call “substantive infor-
mation about current policy decisions, events, conditions, and developments.”
59
 It means that if 
asked about future developments of public opinion participants often referred to current condi-
tions or events and considered their effects on the future opinion of others. They also found that 
personal opinion was a relevant cue regarding both judgments (social projection), but was more 
pronounced when people estimated the future state of public opinion. Poll information however 




Following Shamir and Shamir’s qualitative work, we also expect differences regarding the 
importance of specific cues to current and future public opinion perceptions: 
H5a: Survey results as a social cue to public opinion will exert a stronger influence on judg-
ments about the current state of public opinion than on judgments about its future state. 
H5b: Arguments as substantive information will exert a stronger influence on judgments about 
the future state of public opinion than on judgments about its current state.  
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H5c: Social projection will be more pronounced for judgments regarding the future climate of 
opinion than for those of the current climate of opinion. 
 
Relationships Between Media Cues and Perceived Climate of Opinion  
The relationships between media cues, individual opinion, and climate-of-opinion percep-
tions presented so far are closely linked to one another, and can therefore be integrated theoreti-
cally. The model shown in Figure 1 is an attempt to describe how judgments on the climate of 
opinion are formed. We assume two effects of poll information presented in a news report: On the 
one hand, it will trigger people to align their opinion to the majority opinion indicated by the poll 
(H3a). On the other hand, recipients immediately learn about the current opinion distribution and 
use this information when assessing the climate of opinion (H1).  
  Arguments contained in the media as implicit cues, also initiate two cognitive processes. 
Firstly, they exert a persuasive effect on personal opinions (H3b), and secondly, recipients infer 
the climate of opinion from the slant of the arguments presented (H2). In addition, the model 
takes into account that people project their personal opinions onto the social environment (H4). 
Thereby, indirect effects of media cues are also possible, because survey information or argu-
ments might initially influence one’s personal opinion, which in turn shapes climate-of-opinion 





Study Design and Stimulus 
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To test our hypotheses, we conducted an online experiment in which a (fictional) newspa-
per report on the extension of an express railway in a suburb of Cologne in Germany served as a 
stimulus. The topic seemed appropriate for two reasons: Firstly, it allowed us to present and ma-
nipulate arguments in favor of and against the extension (implicit cue) as well as survey results 
(explicit cue) within the article. Secondly, because of its regional character we did not expect the 
issue being associated with strong attitudes, prior knowledge, or high thematic involvement, since 
these factors might shape judgments as well.
61
 After participants read the newspaper article they 
answered various questions concerning our central constructs as well as socio-demographic char-
acteristics.  
The experiment was based on a 3x4 design with “tendency of survey results” and “slant of 
argumentation” serving as experimental factors. Survey results, as an explicit cue to public opin-
ion, varied on three levels: The article contained a survey showing either a clear (26% in support, 
74% opposed), or a narrow (48% in support, 52% opposed) opposition of Cologne’s citizens to 
the railway extension. Participants in the control condition received no survey information. Sur-
vey results were presented in the text and as a chart which was titled: „Cologne’s citizens’ opin-
ion of the railway extension”, and showed two bars indicating the proportion of Citizens in favor 
of and against the extension, including percentages.   
As an implicit cue, the article contained arguments that were directly related to the line 
extension.
62
 We varied the slant of argumentation on four levels: It was either in favor of (two 
positive arguments: easing of heavy traffic, positive effect on the environment) or against (two 
negative arguments: relocation of inhabitants, costs for the city) the extension. In addition, we set 
up one condition with an ambivalent argumentation that contained both positive and negative 
arguments listed above. A final version of the article contained no arguments. 
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Sample and Participant Selection 
Participants were recruited in April 2012 via a noncommercial online access panel and 
asked to take part in a survey on direct democracy, in order to conceal the actual purpose of the 
study. A simple randomizing mechanism determined assignment to one of the twelve experi-
mental conditions. For the analysis, we excluded those who spend less than 40 seconds reading 
the stimulus, since this was identified as the minimum time required to read the text completely. 
Also, individuals living in Cologne or nearby were removed from the sample. The remaining 
1.351 participants were almost equally distributed among the experimental groups. There were no 
significant differences between groups regarding education (χ²(55) = 37.95, p = .96), gender 
(χ²(11) = 9.71, p = .56), or age (F(11, 696) = 1.18; p = .29). 
 
Measures  
Assessment of the current climate of opinion. We measured participants’ perceptions of 
the current climate of opinion using two items (“At the moment, the majority of Cologne’s citi-
zens are against the extension” [CC 1] and “Right now Cologne’s citizens do not want an exten-
sion of the express line” [CC 2]). Participants could report their agreement on a five-point Likert 
scale ranging from 1 (I don’t agree at all) to 5 (I totally agree). Both items made up a scale with 
satisfactory reliability (Spearman-Brown = .70, M = 3.75, SD = 1.21). 
Assessment of the future climate of opinion. Participants were asked to estimate the result 
of an upcoming referendum on the railway extension. Again, two items were used (five-point 
Likert scale) (“The referendum will probably result in a rejection of the railway extension.” [FC 
1], “The citizens of Cologne will probably turn down the planned extension in October.” [FC 2]), 
which subsequently formed a scale (Spearman-Brown = .89, M = 3.52, SD = 1.03). 
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Personal opinion. Participants were presented two items to express their own opinion on 
the railway extension: “I support the line extension” [PO 1] and “In my opinion the railway ex-
tension makes no sense” [PO 2] (five-grade Likert scale). The scale constructed on this basis 
again showed good reliability (Spearman-Brown = .93, M = 3.50, SD = 1.28). 
 
3. Results 
Before we move on to the examination of the relationships depicted by our theoretical 
model, we will first examine the relative influence of the experimental factors. To this end, we 
have conducted a two-way ANOVA with poll results and slant of argumentation as independent 
variables and the current and future opinion climate assessments as dependent variables (Figure 
2).  
Regarding the current climate of opinion, it becomes apparent that the poll results have a 
strong and significant main effect (F(2, 692) = 213.42, p < .001, η² = .38): People aligned their 
assessment of the current climate of opinion closely to the respective poll results. If the article 
presented a clear majority against the railway extension, participants also assumed a large opposi-
tion against the project. Accordingly, judgments were more moderate when the survey indicated 
only a marginal lead for the opposition. The slant of argumentation was found to have a main 
effect too, but it turned out to be much weaker (F(3, 692) = 5.12, p < .01, η² = .02), and did not 
follow a clear pattern. This is also apparent regarding the rather small differences in means be-
tween the argumentation groups (Figure 2). 
Things change considerably if we turn to the estimated future climate of opinion. Alt-
hough participants also conform their judgments to the survey results (F(2, 615) = 112.56, p < 
.001, η² = .27), the effect of arguments increases somewhat (F(3, 615) = 14.21, p < .001, η² = 
.07). It is interesting to see that arguments especially have an effect in cases of uncertainty that is 
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to say if survey results are ambiguous or completely missing. In this case, climate of opinion as-
sessments noticeably follow argumentation slant: arguments against extension lead to the impres-
sion that the railway-project will lose public support, whereas arguments in favor have the oppo-
site effect. People who were shown ambivalent or no arguments tend towards the middle of the 
scale. This interaction effect proves to be statistically significant (F(6, 615) = 3.32, p < .01, η² = 
.03) and becomes apparent when the pro and contra groups are compared within the condition of 
no survey information. While members of the pro group tend to predict public support in the fu-
ture (M = 2.31, SD = .93), the contra group tends to believe that the extension will be rejected (M 
= 3.45, SD = .93). 
 
Figure 2  
 
We will now turn to the more complex relationships depicted by our theoretical model 
(Figure 1) and include participants’ personal opinions in the analysis by using a linear structural 
equation model (SEM). Structural equation modeling has two important advantages: Firstly, la-
tent variables can be integrated into the analysis, which usually yield a higher reliability than sin-
gle manifest indicators. Secondly, the strengths of indirect relationships between the variables, in 
addition to direct relationships, can be quantified and tested statistically.
63
 Survey results were 
integrated into the SEM as a dummy variable (0 = slight lead for extension opponents, 1 = clear 
lead for extension opponents). The slant of argumentation was coded as an ordinal variable (-1 = 




Figure 3 shows the results for assessments of the current opinion climate as the dependent 
variable. The model shows a good fit
65
 (χ² = 1.258, df = 5, p = .94; SRMR = .007; RMSEA = 
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.000; CFI = 1.00) and two effects of the experimental treatments can be observed: Firstly, the 
survey results considerably influenced assessments of the current opinion climate (β = -.51, p < 
.001). People who saw an article picturing a large majority against the railway extension estimat-
ed the current proportion of opponents to be higher than participants who received information 
about a small lead of opponents. Secondly, argumentation had a significant effect: Participants 
based their own opinion on the railway extension predominantly on the arguments they found in 
the text (β = .42, p < .001). Arguments against led to rejection of the project, and conversely, pos-
itively connoted arguments led to an increase of acceptance. 
Survey information had a much weaker, but yet significant effect on participants’ personal 
opinions (β = -.10, p < .05). When a large majority opposing the extension was presented opin-
ions also tended slightly in this direction. Contrary to our expectations we found no effect of ar-
gumentation on the perceived climate of opinion (β = -.10, p = .06). Consequently, hypotheses 
H1, H3a and H3b are confirmed, whereas H2 is not. Finally, we assumed a projection of personal 
opinion on others (H4), which is also confirmed: the more a person supported the railway exten-
sion, the less public opposition against the project he or she suspected (β = .16, p < .05). 
At first glance, argumentation slant seems to have a rather weak effect on climate of opin-
ion perceptions. Yet, following the model, arguments do not only exert a direct influence, but also 
work indirectly through projection. If, for instance, a person forms an opinion on the line exten-
sion on the basis of a news article, and subsequently projects his or her opinion on the citizens of 
Cologne, this is an indirect effect worth considering. Multiplying the coefficients along the re-
spective model path
66
 results in a mild, indirect effect of argumentation (βind = .07, p < .05). In 
contrast, when it comes to survey information, no indirect effect on the perceived climate of opin-
ion occurs (βind = -.02, p = .13). 
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Figure 3  
The relationships described above can analogously be examined to explain assessments of 
the future climate of opinion. Again, the model corresponds well to the empirical data (χ² = 5.329, 
df = 5, p = .38; SRMR = .012; RMSEA = .01; CFI = 1.00). Compared to the first model, the fun-
damental directions of effects remain mostly the same, and thus conform to the hypotheses. Addi-
tionally, the strength of several relationships changes only slightly, if at all: The survey still exerts 
a weak effect on participants’ personal opinions (β = -.10, p < .05), just as argumentation remains 
inconsequential for assessing the future opinion climate (β = -.05, p = .33). Nevertheless, it still 
influenced participants to personally agree or disagree with the railway project, as strongly as in 





On the one hand, the effect of survey results on evaluations of the climate of 
opinion weakened (β = -.34, p < .001). Although participants still based their forecasts to a great 
deal on the available survey information, they did so to a considerably lesser degree than in case 
of judgments on the current climate of opinion. In contrast, the importance of personal opinion 
increased: Participants now had a more pronounced tendency to project their own opinion onto 
others (β = .33, p < .001), which consequently also reinforced the aforementioned indirect effect 
of argumentation slant (βind = .14, p < .001). Therefore, H5a and H5c are also corroborated. How-
ever, we did not find significant effects of argumentation slant – neither on current nor on future 
public opinion perception and therefore had to reject H5b. 
 
Figure 4  
 
4. Discussion 
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Our findings indicate a strong, direct effect of survey information on individual percep-
tions of the current and future climate of opinion, since they provide a direct cue to existing opin-
ion distributions and are therefore easily applicable to judgments. In addition, we showed that the 
representation of survey data also influences personal opinions, although this effect turned out to 
be considerably weaker. Our findings confirm the results of previous studies, which also revealed 




Arguments strongly shape recipients’ individual opinions, which is in accordance with our 
initial suppositions. However, contrary to our expectations, had no direct effect on the perception 
of public opinion. Nevertheless this should not lead to an underestimation of their influence: 
Firstly, they have a relatively strong indirect effect on climate-of-opinion perceptions, which is 
conveyed through social projection – a finding confirmed by other studies as well.
69
 Secondly, 
the ANOVA shows that arguments influence climate of opinion judgments when survey infor-
mation is absent or ambivalent which should be quite common in everyday coverage. The possi-
bility of substituting specific cues to public opinion by others which are currently available is also 
mentioned by Shamir and Shamir who found that people made less use of their own opinion as a 
cue to public opinion when e.g. media cues were available.
70
 
We suggest two possible explanations for this hierarchy of effects: On the one hand, it 
supports our assumption that survey information fits judgments on the climate of opinion quite 
well (high applicability). People simply judge survey data to be a more adequate indicator of pub-
lic opinion than article slant. On the other hand, ambivalent or absent information could increase 
recipients’ uncertainty regarding their assessment of the climate of opinion resulting in the use of 
additional information. Both assumptions should be further investigated also because media re-
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ports usually offer different cues influencing perceptions of public opinion. Both, researchers and 
media professionals should be aware of their inter-dependencies. 
However, the findings presented here should be interpreted with caution for numerous 
reasons: Firstly, the topic we selected as a stimulus (railway extension in Cologne) represents a 
rather special judgment situation which, according to Fleitas can be considered a minimal infor-
mation election.
71
 The term refers to situations in which individuals form judgments or make de-
cisions based on limited prior knowledge, unstable attitudes, and a lack of information. As a re-
sult, their assessments derive primarily from the information available, which consequently has a 
strong effect. This certainly explains the strong persuasive influence of the arguments presented 
in the text, but also that of survey information on individual opinions. The latter result is also 
confirmed by previous studies on the effects of survey coverage.
72
 The uncertain character and 
the small amount of information within our experimental setting also correspond to the social 
proof interpretation as the mechanism underlying survey effects on personal opinion.
73
 Secondly, 
by choosing a geographically distant and unknown issue we intentionally tried to avoid an influ-
ence of preexisting attitudes and issue involvement. Although we increased internal validity this 
way both variables still represent important moderators of poll effects. Mutz e.g. shows that under 
moderate involvement conditions (compared to the high involvement condition) consensus in-
formation leads to an intensified issue related cognitive responses and attitude change.
74
 Similar-
ly, Hardmeier in her extensive literature review states that that poll effects seem to be more pro-
nounced when people are less involved and have weak predispositions.
75
 
The prominent placement of the survey information within the article (text and chart) is 
also a special feature of our study and most likely increased the importance of poll information 
for recipients’ judgments.
76
 Current studies on the effects of exemplars indicate stronger effects 
associated with graphically represented statistical descriptions of reality.
77
 Furthermore the high 
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salience of survey information could also account for differences between the current study and a 
similar experiment conducted by Gunther and Christen. Contrary to our results, they find a domi-
nant influence of news slant on climate of opinion evaluations. However, their operationalization 
of public opinion information differs from ours, since majority ratios were mentioned rather 
shortly in the text without percentages (e.g. “most Americans”, “very few Americans”). But we 
certainly agree with the authors who state that: “Actual public opinion information can arguably 




Finally, the relationship between personal opinion and perceived climate of opinion that 
we interpreted as projection can also be read in the opposite direction. Thus, participants could 
have first formed a certain impression of existing opinion distributions, to which they subsequent-
ly adopt their own opinion. With regard to the second interpretation, Deutsch and Gerard
79
 define 
two categories of majority influence. Normative influence occurs because the individual expects 
sanctions when it does not conform to the group. Such an explanation would reflect theoretical 
ideas also included in the spiral of silence.
80
 Informational influence, as the second category, is 
motivated by a desire for accuracy and therefore very similar to the social proof interpretation we 
discussed above.  
We believe that in our experimental setting the fear of isolation was rather low, due to the 
vast social and geographic distance of the reported situation. Hence, it seems unlikely that recipi-
ents show conformity reactions caused by normative influence. On the other hand, informational 
influence might have been at work: Due to their lack of prior knowledge, participants could have 
tended to consider the majority opinion to be an indicator of validity. In this case, they would 
have based their opinion on the following consideration: If so many citizens in Cologne oppose 
the project, then they must have a point. Assuming that this explanation is correct, the influence 
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of the climate of opinion on one’s own opinion should weaken or at least remain stable when par-
ticipants have no information about the opinions of Cologne’s inhabitants. However, additional 
analyses do not support this assumption. We calculated correlations between participants’ per-
sonal opinion and their perceptions of the current / future public opinion for each of the experi-
mental condition separately. The relationship was weaker in the case of clear (current climate: r = 
-.05, p > .05; future climate: r = -.16, p < .01) and narrow poll results (current climate: r = -.08, p 
> .05; future climate: r = -.30, p < .001) than in the condition without any poll information (cur-
rent climate: r = -.29, p > .001; future climate: r = -.46, p < .001). While the same pattern holds 
for the present and future climate, the correlations are generally stronger in the latter case. These 
findings may indicate that public opinion assessments and personal opinions co-vary more 
strongly if polls are lacking. In order to further support the projection interpretation it is also im-
portant to note that our stimulus reported the arguments against or in favor of the express railway 
before poll information was brought up. This of course, did not fully assure that recipients first 
formed an opinion and then projected it onto public opinion, but it can be seen as an additional 
argument supporting our initial assumption. This interpretation is also supported by empirical 
studies showing that the influence of others’ opinions decreases considerably when individuals 
had the chance to form an opinion in advance.
81
 
Another central finding of the present experiment is that the slant of media coverage does 
not affect perceptions of the (current and future) climate of opinion. Participants, hence, neither 
assume that the report will influence the opinions of others (persuasive press inference) nor that it 
reflects public opinion (reflection). Additionally, if judgments would follow a persuasive press 
inference one would expect a correlation between the slant of argumentation and perceived future 
climate of opinion since the report should at least affect people’s opinions after some time has 
passed. Perhaps participants did not consider the news report to be persuasive enough, which 
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would hinder a persuasive press inference or they did not perceive the article as a reflection of the 
current situation, but rather as single opinion of a journalist. 
Our findings offer numerous possibilities for future studies. Firstly, one could draw more 
attention to the relative importance of implicit and explicit cues to public opinion in news reports. 





, these do not permit an integrative or comparative analysis of these indicators. 
Additionally, as the comparison with the study by Gunther and Christen has shown, the effect of 
different media content can shift due to minor changes in coverage or presentation
84
, which there-
fore should be examined as well. In this context, field studies could shed light to the question to 
what extent cumulation and consonance of certain content cues exert an influence on opinions 
and the perceived climate of opinion. Furthermore, longitudinal studies could answer the question 
whether, and under what conditions, either conformity to the perceived climate of opinion or so-
cial projection occurs. 
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Appendix 
Table 1   
Bivariate Correlations Between the Variables in Model 1  
 1 2 3 4 
1. Tendency of poll results  –    
2. Slant of argumentation .00 –   
3. Personal opinion -.11** .37*** –  
4. Current climate of opinion .40*** .02 .14*** – 
Note. ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05 
 
Table 2   
Bivariate Correlations Between the Variables in Model 2  
 1 2 3 4 
1. Tendency of poll results –    
2. Slant of argumentation .00 –   
3. Personal opinion -.11** .37*** –  
4. Future climate of opinion .39 -.15*** .30*** – 
Note. ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05 
 










Figure 1. Effects of Implicit and Explicit Cues on Climate of Opinion Perceptions 
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Figure 2. Effects of Survey and Argumentation on Assessments of the Current and Future 
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Figure 3. Effects of Implicit and Explicit Cues on the Perceived Current Climate of Opinion 
Note. Standardized path coefficients (β): *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05;  
Model fit: χ² = 1.258, df = 5, p = .939; SRMR = .007; RMSEA = .000; CFI = 1.000; n = 564. 
All significance tests were calculated using bootstrapping (10.000 samples). To facilitate the in-
terpretation of the path coefficients, the scales of the indicators of the constructs “current climate 
of opinion” were reversed. This also applies to the negatively formulated indicator of the con-
struct “personal opinion”.   
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Figure 4. Effects of Implicit and Explicit Cues on the Perceived Future Climate of Opinion  
Note. Standardized path coefficients (β): *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05;  
Model fit: χ² = 5.329, df = 5, p = .377; SRMR = .012; RMSEA = .0011; CFI = 1.000; n = 527. 
All significance tests were calculated using bootstrapping (10.000 samples). To facilitate the in-
terpretation of the path coefficients, the scales of the indicators of the constructs “future climate 
of opinion” were reversed. This also applies to the negatively formulated indicator of the con-
struct “personal opinion”.  
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